Towards a More Global Government Procurrent Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguary Round by De, Graaf Gerard & King, Matthew
GERARD DE GRAAF*
MATTHEW KING*
Towards a More Global Government
Procurement Market: The Expansion of
the GATT Government Procurement
Agreement in the Context of the
Uruguay Round
Agreement on expanding the GATT Government Procurement Agreement
(GPA, or Agreement) was reached in Geneva in December 1993 in the context
of the Uruguay Round and formally signed at the Marrakech Conference on April
15, 1994.' The GPA is one of the so-called plurilateral GATT Agreements or
"Codes": contracting parties are the European Union, 2 the United States, Japan,
Canada, the five European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries, 3 South
Korea,4 and Israel. The Agreement is due to come into force at the beginning
of 1996.
It has been estimated that the new GPA will open to international bidding
government contracts worth around US$350 billion every year, approximately
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
authors.
*The authors, officials in the European Commission, participated in the negotiations on behalf
of the European Union. The views expressed are entirely their own.
1. Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Uruguay Round, Annex 4: Plurilateral
Trade Agreements, Apr. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, GATT File [hereinafter GPA].
2. At the time of the Marrakech Conference the European Union's member states were: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. Three European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries (Austria, Finland,
and Sweden) joined the European Union on January 1, 1995.
3. EFTA states at the time of the negotiations were: Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and
Switzerland.
4. South Korea signed the GPA as a new member.
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a tenfold increase in the value of contracts open to bidding under the present GATT
Government Procurement Agreement.5 This change alone marks a remarkable
success and is testament to the fact that the contracting parties realized the value
of having an international agreement in force that provides for effective rules
ensuring open procurement and for rights of redress to aggrieved suppliers.
Parts I and II of this article point out the key legal obligations among the
contracting parties, as well as the salient features of the coverage negotiations.
For the purpose of this publication, emphasis is placed on the developments and
outcome of the negotiations between the European Union, on the one hand, and
the United States on the other. More in particular, Part III deals with the extended
bilateral coverage negotiations between the European Union and the United
States, which took place between December 15, 1993, and April 15, 1994.
I. Economic and Legal Aspects of the GATT
Government Procurement Agreement
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF OPEN
PROCUREMENT IN THE GATT CONTEXT
First of all, it may be salutary to consider why an international agreement on
open government procurement is really desirable.
It is estimated that the world market for government procurement is well over
US$1,000 billion annually. In the European Union alone, government procure-
ment is estimated to be worth around 15 percent of gross domestic product, of
which about half (between US$300 and US$350 billion) is spent on contracts.
Given that the amounts involved are so large and are at the disposal of govern-
ments, it has in the past proved difficult to inject genuine competition into public
sector markets. Governments have generally tended to give large contracts to
national firms, awarding them not on the basis of price and quality, but on grounds
of nationality.
In certain countries, discrimination against foreign firms has been part of the
legal system for quite some time.6 In other countries, although there may not be
discrimination by law, public procurement practices have tended to be driven by
"buy national" considerations.7 These types of barriers to procurement contracts
have increasingly led to tensions between international trading partners. For
example, in June 1993 an exchange of sanctions between the United States and
the European Union followed their disagreement on access to telecommunications
contracts. During most of 1994, the United States and Japan were involved in
5. Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Tokyo Round, Apr. 12, 1979, 1 B.D.I.E.L.
171, 18 I.L.M. 1052 [hereinafter 1979 Agreement].
6. The United States' "buy American" law, for example, originally dates back to the period
of the Great Depression in the early 1930s.
7. Japan removed official "buy Japanese" legislation from the statute books in the early 1960s.
However, it is widely felt that there continues to be de facto discrimination against foreign suppliers.
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intensive negotiations concerning access to Japanese construction markets and
to contracts for medical and telecommunications equipment. Trade sanctions
were only averted through a last-minute agreement at the end of October 1994.
In addition to avoiding trade conflicts, a set of internationally agreed rules
aimed at open and competitive procurement will promote trade among countries
and lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. Increased competition among
suppliers for public contracts will also enable substantial budgetary savings to
governments8 and higher quality procurements. For dynamic industry, a wider
market offers the possibility to benefit from economies of scale and provides a
solid base to bear high research and development costs. Thus, the justification
for a clear set of rules governing procurement under the GPA is, in principle,
an entirely economic one.
B. THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT AWARD RULES UNDER THE GPA
One of the aims of the negotiators was to improve the text of the 1979
Agreement. This goal meant in the first place that the rules ensuring nondiscrimi-
nation had to be reinforced and that specific provisions on bid challenge had to
be included. Furthermore, the fact that the GPA would apply to lower levels of
government, as well as to several utilities sectors of more industrial or quasi-
commercial character, required an adaptation of the rules. Specific provisions
also had to be included to take account of the coverage of service and construction
contracts. The new GPA, therefore, contains twenty-three articles compared to
only nine articles under the 1979 Agreement, and the number of pages has more
than doubled.
It is fair to say that the key elements of the new GPA are derived largely from
the European Union's directives on public procurement. However, the text of
the GPA was agreed to only after lengthy negotiations, and some of the provisions
on transparency, deadlines for and challenges to bidding, 9 and the scope of the
Agreement (notably self-denial' ° ) could only be resolved in the closing stages
of the negotiations. The following elements are addressed in the Agreement:
8. Open and competitive procurement could save E.U. governments up to US$30 billion annu-
ally, i.e., between 5% and 10% of total procurement expenditures. THE COST OF NON-EUROPE
(study prepared for the European Commission, 1987). If savings of only 3 % are realized as a result
of the GPA (estimated value of coverage: US$350 billion), there would be more than US$10 billion
net savings per year for the contracting parties' budgets.
9. Discussions focused primarily on a U.S. proposal to provide for the possibility of canceling
contracts after they have been signed and a proposal to introduce a "cooling-off' period between
the decision to award a contract and its signature in order to enable challenges from unsuccessful
suppliers. Neither proposal was retained in the final text.
10. The concept of self-denial would require parties to refrain from introducing discriminatory
measures in contracts not covered by the GPA. A provision to this effect proposed by the European
Union was not inserted into the final text. However, the parties agreed to a "best endeavors" text
requiring them to work toward removing existing discrimination and to oppose proposals to introduce
further discrimination. GPA, supra note 1, art. XXIV(7)(c).
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1. Thresholds and Valuation of Contracts
The GPA specifies thresholds above which its detailed rules will apply. These
thresholds are different depending on the level of government and type of procure-
ment concerned" and are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), an
international unit of account roughly equivalent to the European Currency Unit
(ECU) and the U.S. dollar. In addition, the method of calculating the value of
a contract is specified so that, for example, if a single requirement will need
more than one contract to be offered, the total value of those contracts is taken
into account when deciding whether or not the procurement is to be considered
an above-threshold contract, and therefore subject to the provisions of the GPA.' 2
It should be recalled that the rule of the origin of products is defined so as to
be compatible with the rules of origin used in the normal course of trade.
2. Technical Specifications
The GPA also stipulates that technical specifications used in tender documents
should be based on the performance rather than the design of a given product,
and that those specifications should be based on international standards approved
by the International Standards Organization, rather than national standards. In the
European Union, the European standards-setting bodies CEN' 3 and CENELEC
14
already have a long-standing policy under which European standards are based,
as far as possible, on international standards and favor the use of performance
criteria. In the United States, there is considerable fragmentation of standards-
setting bodies, which generally take less account of international standards. This
lack of uniformity will have to change under the new Agreement.
3. Information to Prospective Bidders
Contracting authorities listed in the annexes of the GPA (and therefore subject
to the rules of the GPA) have to advertise all their procurements that are of a value
greater than that specified by the relevant threshold and that are not specifically
excluded under the GPA.' 5 The journals that advertise those notices are listed
in a separate appendix to the GPA.'
6
A number of different notices can attract suppliers' interests. ' 7 First, notices
11. Generally, though not exclusively, this difference means that at the central government level,
goods and services contract thresholds are set at 130,000 SDRs, at subcentral government level at
200,000 SDRs, and for utilities at 400,000 SDRs, while the threshold for construction contracts is
set at 5 million SDRs for all these categories. Id. app. I. The GPA thresholds are very near to the
values of the thresholds contained in the European Union's directives on public procurement.
12. GPA, supra note 1, art. II, para. 4.
13. European Committee for Standardization.
14. European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization.
15. Id. art. XXIII (e.g., for security reasons).
16. These journals include, for example, the European Union's Official Journal Supplement,
the United States' Commerce Business Daily, and Japan's Kanpo. Id. app. II.
17. Id. art. IX.
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on planned procurement give the broad outlines of the expected procurement of
an entity for the coming year. Individual notices of proposed procurement are
the main notices required. The required content of the notices, to be published
in one of the GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) languages, 8 is specified
by the GPA.' 9 Such content must include, for example, whether the award proce-
dure will be open, selective, or limited; precise information on the nature and
quantity of procurements required; and the time limit for the submission of ten-
ders. If an entity runs a qualification system to prequalify suppliers, then a notice,
which may at the same time serve as a call for competition for subcentral govern-
ments and utilities, is also required. There is also a post-award notice in which
information on the winning tenderer has to be included.
4. Qualification and Selection of Tenderers
The GPA allows for the qualification of suppliers, but in such a way as to ensure
that all interested suppliers have adequate time and opportunity to participate
effectively in the qualification process.2 ° A clause prevents discrimination on
grounds of nationality against suppliers wishing to qualify.2 Selection procedures
for all prospective bidders must be open, and the GPA requires that the maximum
number of tenders from both domestic and foreign suppliers must be encouraged,
in order to ensure "optimum effective international competition.' 22 Open or
selective tendering procedures are therefore the rule and limited tendering is
the exception.23 Apart from being used for the procurement of works of art or
prototypes, for additional deliveries of a given product that has already been
supplied, or in cases of extreme urgency, the limited tendering procedure may
also be used when no bids were received in response to an open or selective
tender, or in a few other cases that would not damage international competition.24
5. Award of Contracts
The criteria for making an award are either the lowest price or the economically
most advantageous tender based on various criteria such as quality, technical
18. English, French, and Spanish.
19. GPA, supra note 1, art. IX, para. 6.
20. Id. art. VIII.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. X, para. 1.
23. Under open tendering procedures, all interested suppliers may submit a tender. Under selec-
tive tendering procedures, only those suppliers invited to do so by the contracting entity may submit
a tender. Limited tendering procedures are those procedures where the entity contacts suppliers
individually.
24. Specifically, these cases concern (a) the purchase of construction services that were not
specified in the original contract or are repeat construction services, (b) procurements following a
design contest that has been organized in a manner fully consistent with the principles of the GPA,
(c) the purchase of products on a commodities market, or (d) purchases made under exceptionally
advantageous conditions that will only arise in the very short term.
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merit, delivery costs, and price.25 These criteria have not been changed from
the original GPA.26 The Agreement also has specific provisions on debriefing
unsuccessful tenderers, at their request, on the characteristics and relevant advan-
tages of the tender selected as well as the name of the winning tenderer.27
6. Statistics
In order to help the Committee on Government Procurement, set up under the
GPA ,28 to monitor the application of the Agreement, the GPA stipulates in article
XIX that each party should collect statistics on an annual basis on the number
and value of contracts tendered by entities operating at central government and
subcentral government level, as well as by utilities. Information on the use of
derogations to the GPA also has to be supplied. The issue of statistics has attracted
a lot of political interest under the 1979 Agreement.
7. Bid Challenge and Dispute Settlement
Finally, the GPA provides for challenge procedures for aggrieved suppliers.
As it turned out, article XX was one of the most contentious articles during the
negotiations. The outcome is that parties should encourage their suppliers to
carry out consultations in order to try to resolve any dispute amicably, but that
each party should also put in place effective procedures enabling the challenge
of contract awards. These procedures would normally take place in the national
courts of the party concerned. Such challenge procedures should provide for
speedy redress. However, it is stipulated that compensation for the loss or damages
suffered as a result of a breach "may be limited to costs for tender preparation
or protest." 29 The contracting parties themselves also have the right to consulta-
tions and dispute settlement if they feel that their benefits under the GPA are
subsequently nullified or impaired. 30 These disputes will be heard by the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of the new WTO.
25. GPA, supra note 1, art. XIII, para. 4.
26. Compare 1979 Agreement, supra note 5, art. V, with GPA, supra note 1, art. XIII, para.
4.
27. GPA, supra note 1, art. XVIII.
28. Id. art. XXI.
29. GPA, supra note 1, art. XX, para. 7(c). Discussions made clear the different approaches
taken with regard to bid challenges between the United States, on the one hand, and the European
Union, EFTA, and Japan, on the other. Limiting damages to recovery of bid-preparation costs only
was important to the latter group. The United States favored a punitive damages approach.
30. Three disputes have been brought before the Government Procurement Committee since
1981. In a "Value-Added Tax (VAT)" panel case between the United States and the European Union
on the inclusion by the European Union of VAT in the calculation of its threshold values, the panel
determined that the European Union had to apply a threshold that was 13 % lower than that applied
by the other parties. In the "Trondheim" panel case between the United States and Norway on
contracts awarded for toll booths, the panel held that Norway was in breach of the 1979 Agreement.
In the "Sonar Mapping" panel case between the European Union and the United States, the panel
found that the United States was in breach of the 1979 Agreement when it imposed a "buy American"
restriction on a procurement organized by the National Science Foundation.
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II. Negotiations on Coverage of Contracting
Entities and Contracts
A. BACKGROUND TO THE COVERAGE NEGOTIATIONS
When negotiations started in 1988, it was agreed that parties should try to
expand the coverage of the 1979 Agreement as far as possible. While the 1979
Agreement provides for coverage of supply contracts by central government
entities (known in the jargon of the GPA as "Category A" procurements), the
negotiators concurred that the new Agreement should cover all types of contracts
(including service and construction contracts) awarded by both central and sub-
central (regional and local) governments ("Category B"), as well as by specified
utilities sectors ("Category C").
Needless to say, this amount of coverage was a very ambitious target. However,
talks in Geneva on the GPA had been effectively stalled in early 1992 over the
question of the balance of the offers made by the European Union and the United
States. The United States had always maintained, based on statistical information
reported to the GATT under the 1979 Agreement, that it was providing over
half the bidding opportunities available through the 1979 Agreement. This percep-
tion was particularly strong in the U.S. Congress where it was felt that the United
States had drawn the short straw with regard to the balance of benefits under
the 1979 Agreement, and therefore, under the GPA, the United States should
get its fair share. In the same spirit, Congress inserted title VII in the U.S. Trade
Agreements Act of 1987."' Title VII requires the U.S. administration to submit
annually to Congress a report on the level of openness of foreign procurement
markets.32 Whenever it is established that U.S. firms suffer from discrimination
in a particular country this country is "identified," and the administration is
legally obliged to try to resolve the problems through negotiations with the country
concerned within certain deadlines.33 Failing a successful conclusion of negotia-
tions, sanctions are imposed. Pressure from Congress strongly influenced the U.S.
Trade Representatives34 throughout the negotiations with the European Union.
The European Union, however, contested the U.S. position on balance under
the 1979 Agreement. The European Union took the position that the information
it returned to the GATT misrepresented the scale of opportunities that were being
offered in the European Union. Indeed, as better reporting procedures were put
in place throughout the Member States of the European Union, the situation
began to change. Recent returns have shown the E.U. figures to be rising, while
31. Trade Agreements Act of 1987, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988).
32. Id. § 2525(d).
33. Id. § 1415(0, (g).
34. Carla Hills during the Bush administration and Michael Kantor during the Clinton administra-
tion.
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U.S. figures have been steadily falling."5 Furthermore, the European Union vigor-
ously challenged the reliability of the U.S. statistics. It brought to the attention
of the GATT Government Procurement Committee that U.S. notices, in as many
as one third of cases, did not make clear that the contracts were open to foreign
suppliers. According to the European Union, in a system that is inherently discrim-
inatory,36 foreign suppliers would only actively bid if they were given reassurances
that advertised contracts were indeed accessible. Furthermore, the European
Union failed to find traces of notices regarding a large number of contracts the
United States had included in its statistical reports to the GATT. In short, the
European Union believed that while its own statistics significantly understated
the volume of covered contracts, the U.S. figures clearly exaggerated opportuni-
ties for foreign business.
B. NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
While both sides of course wanted to achieve balanced coverage, it is helpful
to recall their more specific negotiating objectives. The United States' main
negotiating target was to achieve unrestricted access to the strategically important
electrical and telecommunications procurement sectors of the European Union.
This goal required, in particular, the disapplication in these sectors of article 29
of the European Union's Utilities Directive to U.S. origin bids.37 Article 29
provides for a Community preference to be applied by E.U. contracting entities
operating in the utilities sectors in their award of supply contracts. The U.S.
administration, under pressure from U.S. heavy electrical and telecommunica-
tions industries, had identified the European Union as a "country" discriminating
against U.S. interests in its 1992 report to Congress pursuant to the Trade
Agreements Act. 38 This accusation-followed by the threat of trade sanctions-
served to increase political tensions surrounding the dispute. Perhaps surprisingly,
the United States showed less interest in coverage of subcentral procurement in the
35. In 1992 the figure the European Union reported to the GATT was 9 billion SDRs, up from
around 2.5 billion SDRs in the early 1980s. The U.S. figure for the same year was around 13 billion
SDRs, down from around 20 billion SDRs in the early 1980s.
36. For example, in many cases it was not indicated whether the contract had been set aside for
U.S. small businesses or particular disadvantaged groups or whether it was covered by another U.S.
exemption. Foreign suppliers will also refrain from tendering for contracts with a value close to the
threshold, for fear that if the value is below the threshold, "buy American" legislation would apply.
37. Council Directive 90/531, art. 29, 1990 O.J. (L 297) [hereinafter Utilities Directive], which
entered into force on January 1, 1993, allows contracting entities to reject bids comprising more
than 50% non-E.U. origin products. In the event such bids are not rejected, the entity has to give
preference to an E.U. bid if, all other criteria being equal, the price differential does not exceed
3%. (Article 29 has now become article 3 in the consolidated version of the Utilities Directive,
which entered into force on July 1, 1994). Council Directive 93/38, art. 36, 1993 O.J. (L 199)
[hereinafter Consolidated Directive].
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2515(d).
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European Union. However, this may be explained by the fact that no Community
preference similar to the provision in the Utilities Directive exists in these sectors.
The European Union, on the other hand, did seek unfettered access to state
and major city level procurement in the United States, particularly for entities
applying "buy local" policies. 39 The European Union also sought the removal
of "buy American" restrictions attached to federal funding (grants and loans)
provided to states and localities. Often entities receiving these funds are required
to use domestic materials or components. However, the scope and detail of the
restrictions vary from program to program ° The most important programs that
carry "buy American" restrictions are: federal-aid highway funds, federal transit
administration grants, 41 airport improvement program grants, waste-water state
revolving fund grants, and Rural Electrification Administration electric and tele-
phone loans. In addition, in accordance with its Utilities Directive, the European
Union had to ensure that it achieved effective and comparable access for its
suppliers to the U.S. electrical and telecommunications markets before it could
waive its Community preference set out in article 29 in those sectors. As in the
United States, the European Union was under pressure from industry to achieve
market opening in the United States and to protect the European Union's strategic
interests.
C. THE E.U.-U.S. BILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
42
It was clear that only a bilateral agreement between the European Union and
the United States could break the deadlock in Geneva. Following intensive negoti-
ations, with increasing political heat on both sides of the Atlantic, the European
Union and the United States reached a partial agreement on April 22, 1993, in
Washington. The two-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was essen-
tially a credit transaction in which both sides made a "down payment," 43 which
was intended to pave the way for a future, more ambitious agreement, ideally
in the GATT framework.
39. More than half of U.S. states apply one form or another of "buy local" policies. Some of
these tend to be prohibitive at least for certain categories of products. Furthermore, 13 out of the
24 major cities that have populations greater than 500,000 apply discriminatory procurement policies.
40. "Buy American" restrictions are generally attached to federal programs by the U.S. Congress
during appropriations procedures. To receive funds, entities specify that contractors must provide
at least 50 % (60% in public transportation) American-made components and carry out final assembly
in the United States. If these conditions are not met, 25% is added to the contractor's bid price.
Because of this strong price preference given to domestic bids, foreign contractors are effectively
excluded from bids for federally funded projects. The total value of federal programs carrying "buy
American" restrictions is over US$10 billion.
41. Typically, these restrictions have contributed to decisions by certain European public trans-
portation equipment manufacturers to transplant some of their manufacturing capacity from Europe
to the United States.
42. Agreement in the Form of a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Economic
Community and the United States, May 10, 1993, O.J. (L 125) [hereinafter MoU].
43. Term employed by U.S. Trade Representative Kantor.
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The MoU opened up contracts at the U.S. federal and E.U. central government
level (for goods, services, and construction) on the basis of comprehensive coverage.
The European Union benefited from the inclusion of several additional entities that
had not yet been covered by the United States in the 1979 Agreement, of which
the most important were the Department of Transportation and the Department of
the Interior. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which awards important contracts
for construction, was also added. The European Union maintained its entity coverage
under the Code. In addition, both sides agreed to an exchange of national treatment
as regards the electrical utilities sectors. This exchange meant essentially that the
European Union agreed not to apply the Utilities Directive's Community preference.
In return, the United States agreed to remove "buy American" measures from
procurement by its ten federally controlled electrical utilities, including Bonneville
Power Administration, Western Area Power Administration, Southeastern Power
Administration, Southwestern Power Administration, and Alaska Power Administra-
tion, plus the federally owned Tennessee Valley Authority.
No agreement was reached on procurement by telecommunications operators
and subfederal procurement or on procurement financed by federal funds. With
regard to telecommunications, the European Union emphasized the importance
of the application of certain disciplines with a view to ensuring transparent and
open tendering, in particular by privately owned U.S. telecommunications opera-
tors. This style of tendering was not acceptable to the United States, which
maintained that procurement in this sector was already open to E.U. suppliers.
On subfederal procurement (states, cities, and public utilities), the United States
was not in a position to make commitments for coverage." Such commitments
required the explicit authorization of each individual state and other subfederal
entity. On federal funding, no progress could be made because of its political
sensitivity in the United States.
D. NEXT STEPS
In order to enable a further, more wide-ranging agreement, preferably in the
GATT, but, if necessary, on a bilateral basis, U.S. Trade Representative Kantor
attached a side letter to the MoU committing himself to a number of actions
aimed at increasing the U.S. subfederal offer. In particular, he undertook to:
* "urge the 33 States from which [the United States had] already received
voluntary commitments to provide final commitments";
* "press ahead with work to obtain voluntary commitments from (a) the 17
states from which [there was] no commitment; and (b) major municipalities
• . . and other sub-federal entities operating in or serving those municipali-
ties";
44. The United States had made it clear in April 1993 that 33 states had reacted positively to
the administration's request for inclusion in the GPA. However, at the time, these were not firm
commitments.
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* "consider ways in which . . . federally-mandated measures affecting sub
federal procurements would be removed."
Although it was clear at the time that the United States would have difficulties
in obtaining enough voluntary commitments from the states, cities, and other
public utilities, the European Union always maintained that it needed to see a
substantial return on its "down payment" before it could agree to (a) the extension
of the MoU beyond May 1995, (b) the permanent binding of its electrical sector
in the GPA, or (c) a separate bilateral agreement covering the procurement of
telecommunications network equipment. Furthermore, in order to facilitate future
negotiations, both sides also agreed to hire an independent consultant to assess
the value of their respective offers under the GPA. The deadline for submission
of the study results was set for the end of February 1994. 45
Due to the lack of agreement in the telecommunications sector, the United
States imposed sanctions on E.U. bidders participating in certain U.S. government
below-threshold tenders, including below-threshold contracts awarded by the
federally owned electrical utilities. The sanctions were imposed simultaneously
with ratification of the MoU. The European Union responded in a measured and
controlled way to avoid escalation by imposing limited counter-sanctions against
U.S. bidders. 6
E. THE EXPANDED GATT GPA AGREEMENT
Following the breakthrough on the MoU in May 1993, talks restarted in earnest
between all parties with a view to completing negotiations on expanding the 1979
Agreement by the December 15, 1993, deadline, which had been set as the final
date for all Uruguay Round negotiations. Several parties, particularly Japan and
South Korea, considerably improved their offers during the closing stages of the
negotiations. They might have feared that if the GPA negotiations were unsuccess-
ful, the European Union and the United States would proceed on a bilateral basis,
perhaps allowing EFTA states and Canada to join them in order to create a
genuine "transatlantic procurement area," which would have excluded Japan
and South Korea.
Agreement was finally reached on December 15, 1993, though a number of
exemptions were built into the final deal.
1. Derogations to Most Favored Nation Status
The new Agreement will cover the procurement of goods, services, and con-
struction at central government level, at subcentral government level, and in a
45. For practical reasons, it was not possible to have the study's results earlier without compromis-
ing the study's reliability. The study results were therefore made available to both sides only after
the Uruguay Round deadline of December 15, 1993.
46. The E.U. counter-sanctions also apply to sub-threshold contracts awarded by central govern-
ment.
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number of utilities sectors. The aim of a wide-ranging agreement was therefore
achieved.
In essence, the agreement reached was on the basis of most favored nation (MFN)
treatment47 in Category A, in accordance with fundamental GATT principles.
However, in Categories B and C, parties departed from MFN treatment and agreed
coverage on the basis of strict reciprocity. This approach is explained by the fact
that several parties could not match the more ambitious offers of, in particular, the
European Union and EFTA, which provided for almost comprehensive coverage.
While the principle of reciprocity initially met stiff resistance from other negotiat-
ing parties, 4 it was instrumental in helping to expand the GPA beyond a simple
agreement at Category A level49 into a much more far-reaching agreement that ex-
tends to lower levels of government and several major utilities sectors. °
Where the offers of other parties did not match the completeness of coverage
being offered by the European Union and EFTA,5 the latter reduced their offers
accordingly. For example, Japan and South Korea offered their major subcentral
entities, that is, prefectures (provinces) and cities with population of more than
500,000, whereas the European Union and the EFTA included all subcentral
entities. 52 These offers led the European Union and EFTA to remove, for example,
the right to challenge contracts awarded by public-law bodies (for example, the
Housing Corporations in the United Kingdom or research institutes in France
which are not directly controlled by government but are subject to the European
Union's directives on public procurement) to suppliers from those countries.
Furthermore, parties agreed that, unlike in the European Union's Utilities
Directive, only publicly owned utilities would be included in the Agreement.
The European Union failed to convince other parties of the need to impose certain
disciplines on private-sector utilities which operate under exclusive rights granted
to them by state authorities that could influence their purchasing decisions. The
European Union and EFTA therefore decided not to cover their privately owned
utilities under the GPA.
47. This agreement means that the most favorable treatment afforded by one party to another
would also be extended to all other parties. In practice, all offers at Category A were accepted by
all parties, and almost no exemptions or differences of treatment were added in that category (one
exemption being procurement by NASA, which has not been offered by the United States to Japan
because of Japan's failure to offer access to procurement by its space agencies).
48. Ultimately, Hong Kong, because of the derogations to the MFN principle, refused to sign
the GPA in Marrakech.
49. On the basis of MFN treatment, offers would have been scaled down to the level of the
lowest common denominator in order to achieve balance. It is highly questionable whether an
agreement beyond Category A would have been at all possible on an MFN basis.
50. Electricity generation, public transportation, airports, ports, and water provision are examples
of utilities sectors.
51. The European Union and EFTA closely coordinated their positions during the negotiations.
This planning was, among other things, due to the fact that all EFTA states had applied for membership
to the European Union and, therefore, had an interest in taking on similar international commitments
as the European Union.
52. It is estimated that around 400,000 subeentral entities are included in the E.U. offer.
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In Category C, it was agreed that access would be granted by the European Union
to its utilities sectors only where a party was prepared to offer "comparable and
effective'53 access to the E. U. suppliers to those sectors. This means that, for exam-
ple, as regards Japan, the European Union would offer unrestricted access only to
procurements made by contracting entities in the water, airport, and ports sectors,
but not to contracts awarded by electricity and public transport utilities, as those
were sectors that had not been offered by Japan. For South Korea, the European
Union would open up the electricity, water, and ports sectors, but not the airport and
public transport sectors failing a credible counteroffer.54 However, the European
Union has left open the possibility that other parties may make an offer in relevant
sectors. If that happens, the European Union would be prepared to grant access to
contracts awarded by its own utilities operating in those sectors.
The reciprocity rule was also applied to service contracts in all categories,
because it was impossible to agree on any meaningful list of common services.
Therefore, the rule for services is that unrestricted access to service contracts
will be granted when the parties of both the supplier and contracting entity in
question have both included that service on their individual lists of services an-
nexed to the GPA. For example, Japan has not included financial services in its
list of services, while the European Union, the EFTA, and the United States
have. The latter countries would therefore not be obliged to grant access to
financial services contracts to Japanese service providers.
2. U.S. Offer in Categories B and C Rejected by Other Parties
Despite the success of the GPA negotiations, the European Union and the
United States were only able to strike a deal covering Category A in December
1993. The U.S. offer on Categories B and C was rejected as being insufficient
by the European Union, EFTA, and other parties, except for Israel and South
Korea. The process of obtaining voluntary commitments from states and localities,
which had been intensified following the E.U.-U.S. MoU of May 1993, had
enabled the United States to offer only twenty-four states for coverage." There
was no offer on cities or on public utilities.
Failing agreement, the European Union and the United States decided that
negotiations would continue between them until April 15, 1994, when the GPA
was due to be signed in Marrakech, with a view to reaching agreement with the
53. Under the terms of art. 29 of the Utilities Directive, supra note 37, as restated in art. 36
of the Consolidated Directive, supra note 37, "comparable and effective access" must be granted
by another country to a given utility sector before enterprises of that country can be granted unrestricted
access to that same utility sector in the European Union.
54. South Korea, for example, did not include in its offer the contracting entities responsible
for the construction of airports and the construction of the high-speed railway system.
55. These states included the five biggest states (California, New York, Illinois, Florida, and
Texas). However, in some states only a limited number of contracting entities or contracts were
covered. "Buy American" restrictions for steel, motor vehicles, and printing will be continued in
a number of states.
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United States on Categories B and C, as well as agreement on which E. U. utilities
sectors should be bound in the GPA. Both sides would then also have the benefit
of the results of the study carried out by an independent consultant on the size
of their offers. Talks on an agreement with the United States outside the frame-
work of the GPA on telecommunications procurement would run concurrently.
The results of these negotiations are discussed in Part III below.
III. Further Negotiations
A. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
At the end of March 1994 the consultant hired by the European Union and
the United States released its final report.56 The 356-page document contained
estimates of above-threshold procurements of goods, services, and construction
by the U.S. federal government, each of the fifty states, and twenty-four major
cities as well as for public utilities serving those cities. On the E.U. side data
were provided on central government and subcentral government above-threshold
procurement in each Member State and on utilities across the European Union
as a whole. Having been closely involved in the study exercise, both sides were
fully aware of the enormous difficulties faced by the consultant in collecting data
from several thousand entities in order to make reliable estimates. Therefore,
the European Union and the United States did not regard the estimates as absolute
truths, but accepted that they were indicative of the scale of procurement opportu-
nities on both sides of the Atlantic.
1. Outcome of the Study on the Size of Offers
The negotiators were pleased to see that at the Category A level, the study
confirmed rough balance. However, the figures in the report clearly showed the
European Union to be by far the greatest overall provider of opportunities in the
procurement market, especially at the Category B and C levels. In Category B,
the European Union was offering US$100 billion of procurement opportunity
against US$18 billion for the twenty-four states offered by the United States. In
Category C, the E.U. figure was ten times that of the United States' (US$40
billion against US$3 billion). While the study confirmed the E.U. position that
its offer was much bigger than that of the United States, which helped to defuse
the U.S. Congress's anxiety about imbalance in the 1979 Agreement, it did not
make the negotiation of a balanced agreement any easier. One thing was clear:
the European Union would have to scale down its commitments, whereas the
United States would have to table a better offer. Gradually, the United States
56. STUDY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES, EUROPEAN UNION, GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (prepared at the request of the European Union and United States, Mar. 22,
1994).
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managed to increase the number of voluntary commitments from states. In the
run up to the Marrakech Ministerial Conference, to help the United States focus
its efforts the European Union gave clear indications as to which states, cities,
and public utilities it would like to see covered in an agreement. These were those
with large procurement budgets and those with greater "buy local" restrictions.
2. The Contents of the Agreement
Following intensive negotiations on coverage in Brussels and Washington,
D.C., both sides met again in Marrakech during the signing ceremony for the
Uruguay Round. A conclusion was finally reached on April 13, 1994, and initialed
by the European Commission and the United States Trade Representative along-
side the rest of the Uruguay Round on April 15, 1994. The Agreement was
more comprehensive in coverage than could have originally been hoped for. The
elements of the bilateral agreement with the United States are the following:
* Category A: The coverage of central government entities agreed during the
MoU (and the GPA) was reconfirmed. The annual value of procurement
opportunities here is US$50-55 billion each.
* Category B: The United States was able to improve its offer from twenty-four
to thirty-nine states (thirty-seven to be bound in the GPA, two on a purely
bilateral basis). They account for approximately 80 percent of total state pro-
curement. If states that did not make voluntary commitments, but have few
or no procurement restrictions (for example, North Carolina and Georgia),
are counted as well, then European Union suppliers have access to around 95
percent of U.S. state level procurement. The United States also offered to
grant national treatment in seven of their biggest cities, including Chicago,
Detroit, Dallas, and Boston, and the utilities controlled by those cities, such
as Chicago's O'Hare Airport. National treatment for E.U. suppliers means
treatment similar to out-of-town bidders. (It should be recalled that protection-
ist treatment and reciprocity rules often apply within the United States between
U.S. bidders located in different states or localities.) The European Union,
in order to match the U.S. offer dollar for dollar, scaled down its offer. It will
only cover the procurement of goods, not works or services, by its Category
B. The annual value of procurement here is around US$25 billion.
* Category C: The United States agreed to put the New York/New Jersey
Port Authority (which includes John F. Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark
Airports and New York Port) and Baltimore Port into the GPA. The United
States also agreed to give national treatment on the Massachusetts Port Au-
thority (which includes Boston's Logan Airport). In return, the European
Union agreed to waive article 29 of the Utilities Directive57 on procurement
of supplies of U.S. origin by ports in the European Union. However, the
57. Utilities Directive, supra note 37, art. 29 (the Community preference clause).
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European Union excluded from this waiver dredging services and procure-
ments related to shipbuilding-two areas where the United States was not
willing to remove discrimination against E.U. suppliers. The annual value
of procurement in the port sector is US$1 billion on each side. The European
Union made no offer on airports, despite the inclusion of major U.S. airports,
because the United States was not willing to remove "buy American" legisla-
tion on federal funds destined for airport improvement.
* Utilities Sector: On the electrical sector, the United States and the European
Union added the procurement of services to the procurement of goods and
construction already covered by the MoU. The United States also added
procurements by the New York Power Authority and agreed to waive "buy
American" restrictions on projects financed by the federal Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration (REA), which finances procurements by approximately
1,000 public and private utilities operating in rural areas. The United States
also agreed unilaterally to cut its threshold to the SDR equivalent of
US$250,000 (the European Union will apply a threshold of around
US$500,000). The European Union will continue its nonapplication of article
29 of the Utilities Directive against the United States in the electrical sector.
The annual value of procurements covered here is US$30 billion each, if the
sector as a whole, including investor-owned utilities, is taken into account.
" Transparency in Procurement Notices: The United States and the European
Union also agreed to cooperate to improve transparency in procurement
notices. As described above, this is a particular problem in the U.S. system
where it is not always made clear in notices published in the official publica-
tion, Commerce Business Daily, that procurements are open to foreign bid-
ders. This factor is important for European Union suppliers in view of the
frequent application of legal discrimination policies and set-asides for U.S.
small and minority-owned businesses.
Most of the elements of the Marrakech Agreement will be integrated into the
GPA following its ratification. However, the principle of reciprocity continues to
apply: access will, therefore, only be given to those parties that have made similar
commitments to open their markets. As things currently stand, the United States
will continue to withhold access to Japan to its Category B and Category C offers.
3. No Agreement Reached on Telecommunications
and Federal Funding
No agreement was reached, however, on procurement of telecommunications
equipment, which had remained one of the main U.S. negotiating objectives.
This was mainly due to problems of transparency related to procurement by private
telecommunications operators in the United States58 and political sensitivity in
58. Discussions on a side letter declaring that private telecommunications operators in the United
States procure in an open and competitive way were inconclusive. The European Union felt that this
should be an integral part of any bilateral agreement on telecommunication equipment procurement
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the European Union, but was also due to the fact that the United States was unable
to remove sufficient "buy American" clauses from federally funded programs for
fear of strong opposition from its Congress. Although "buy American" was
waived on the REA funds and all procurements, except for steel,59 under the
federal highways program, "buy American" restrictions will remain in place for
procurements financed by urban transport, waste-water, and airport improvement
funds. Consequently, the European Union will continue to apply article 29 of the
Utilities Directive towards U.S. origin bids in sectors such as telecommunications,
public transport, water, and airports.
The total value of the contracts covered by the bilateral agreement is in the
order of US$100 billion on each side (for the whole of the GPA the figure is
around US$350 billion). The deal is a fair trade-off not only in dollar terms, but
also in terms of negotiating objectives. While the United States has achieved
lasting access to the European Union's electrical sector, many institutionalized
barriers to trade in the United States in the form of price preferences and local
content have been removed for E.U. companies. The agreement will not only
considerably expand trade opportunities, but it will also have a positive effect
on E.U.-U.S. trade relations in general, which have been under some strain in
recent years. 6°
B. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EXPANSION OF COVERAGE
The GPA provides for the possibility to negotiate, either bilaterally or multilat-
erally, further expansion of coverage. Future negotiations will concentrate on
the elimination of certain derogations or nonapplications of elements of the GPA
between the parties. The Marrakech Agreement is a case in point. The Canadian
offer also envisages further negotiations prior to the entry into force of the GPA,
in particular on the coverage of subfederal entities (provinces and cities) and of
entities operating in the utilities sectors.
It should also be noted that several other contracting parties to the GATT have,
at one time or another, expressed an interest in joining the GPA. A concrete
demand for accession has now been received from Aruba, while that of Liechten-
stein has been announced. Australia and New Zealand are currently examining
the possibility ofjoining. At a later stage, countries in Central and Eastern Europe
(the Czech Republic, Hungary), in Central and South America (Mexico, Chile),
and in South-East Asia (Thailand, Malaysia) might be expected to join. Others
(and, therefore, be subject to the dispute settlement provisions). The European Union was also
concerned about the in-house procurement of AT&T (8% of the U.S. market), which is not subject
to open competitive tendering.
59. The value of steel procurements under the federal highways program is approximately US$800
million. The price preference applied in favor of U.S. origin steel is 25%. It has been estimated
that without this restriction U.S. taxpayers could save up to US$250 million annually.
60. Nevertheless, the sanctions imposed by both sides in June 1993 will probably remain in
force.
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may follow. Furthermore, several candidates for accession to the GATT/WTO,
for example, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, have already been
requested to accede to the GPA as a condition of their GATT/WTO accession.
The "variable geometry" of the GPA at Category B and C levels will also
mean that, in time, when nonmember countries wish to become contracting parties
to the GPA, they will, for example, be able to commit lower levels of government
to the GPA later than they agree to commit contracting entities at central govern-
ment level. The disciplines of the GPA will have time to settle in administrations
before less outward-looking regional government entities will have to adhere to
the code, which will be a major factor in encouraging new countries to join the
GPA in the future.
IV. Conclusion
With the successful achievement of their bilateral negotiations, the European
Union and the United States showed that they were able to resolve bilateral trade
disputes in a multilateral framework and set a process in motion designed to lead
to a more open global procurement market. The importance of the GPA is that
suppliers will now be given much greater access to government contracts abroad
than ever before, while the rules and procedures that will have to be followed
by contracting entities will be the same for all. The GPA is therefore an agreement
that is healthy for world trade and should contribute significantly to an export-led
growth of the world economy. With further expansions of its membership, the
GPA will play an increasingly important role in the world economy and will
become a focal point for world trade policy.
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